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Abstract:  Computer  Network  Operations  (CNOs)  refers  to  government  intrusion  and/or
interference with networked information communication infrastructures for the purposes of law
enforcement and security intelligence. The following article explores how CNOs are lawfully
authorised in Australia, and considers the extent to which the current use of CNOs are subject to
‘counter-law’ developments. More specifically, the article finds that the scope and application of
CNOs in Australia are subject to weak legislative controls, that while such operations might be
‘lawful’, they undermine rule of law and disturb core democratic freedoms.
Keywords: Computer network operations, Intelligence, Policing, Rule of law, Surveillance
Article information
Received: 19 Jun 2016 Reviewed: 20 Oct 2016 Published: 14 Mar 2017
Licence: Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Germany
Competing interests: The author has declared that no competing interests exist that have influenced
the text.
URL: http://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/computer-network-operations-and-rule-law-australia
Citation: Molnar, A. & Parsons, C. & Zouave, E. (2017). Computer network operations and ‘rule-with-
law’ in Australia. Internet Policy Review, 6(1). DOI: 10.14763/2017.1.453
INTRODUCTION
Australians  rely  on  companies  which  transit  digital  communications,  provide  digital  data
processing facilities, and retain data for extensive periods of time. Banking, mobile phone use,
communications with government and companies, and other routine aspects of everyday life
depend on the internet and its associated services. But these services must comply with, or be
subject to lawful requests, orders, and security measures from government agencies. One such
set  of  lawful  measures  include  ‘Computer  Network Operations’  (CNO).  A  CNO entails  the
Computer network operations and ‘rule-with-law’ in Australia
Internet Policy Review | http://policyreview.info 2 March 2017 | Volume 6 | Issue 1
electronic  intrusion  and/or  interference  with  equipment  associated  with  network
infrastructures,  such  as  servers  and  routers,  which  are  primarily  used  to  transmit
communications.  While  CNOs can  also  be  an  element  of  broader  operations  which  target
specific devices with malware, such as personal mobile devices, this article focuses explicitly on
the use of CNOs to exploit network infrastructures and the laws authorising such activities by
Australian law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
This article argues that statutory measures that authorise CNOs in Australia pose significant
challenges  to  democratic  rights  and  freedoms.  The  first  section  provides  a  definition  and
background of CNOs in law enforcement and national security operations. Section two sketches
a theoretical framework - counter-law - that is used to analyse and critique the adoption and use
of CNOs. Section three traces the Australian agencies’ adoption of CNOs and the legislation
authorising the use of CNO measures by Australian security and law enforcement agencies.
Section four discusses and analyses how the authorisation of CNOs in Australia is subject to
counter-law developments, and in so doing provides a way to understand how current lawful
practices pose challenges to democratic freedoms. The article concludes by noting some risks
that CNOs pose to democracy if they are not more meaningfully circumscribed by legal and
human rights safeguards.
1. BACKGROUND ON CNOS
‘Going Dark’  is  the popular notion that  changes in information technology are obstructing
intelligence gathering and criminal investigation. In particular, proponents of the Going Dark
position are concerned that the interception of data in transit and at rest, such as emails, VoIP,
chat messages, and texts, is increasingly ineffective due to encryption and the dispersed nature
of online communications (FBI. 2016; Government of Canada, 2016; Comey, 2014, 2016; Hess
2015; Yates, 2015; United Kingdom Government, 2016). To counteract ‘Going Dark’, intelligence
and investigatory authorities are adopting CNO measures into their operational policies.
CNOs represent a significant shift in how governments exercise power as it transitions from
compelled  collection  by  intermediaries,  to  forcibly  acting  upon,  and  collecting  from
intermediaries and affecting their networks, often without their assistance or knowledge. In the
United States, recent changes to powers of criminal procedure under Rule 41 widen the scope of
existing warrant powers to allow federal authorities to conduct CNE across a range of devices
and legal jurisdictions, both domestic and international (Wydenet al.,2016). Similarly, the UK
Investigatory  Powers  Act,  adopted  in  late  2016,  provides  police  and  security  intelligence
agencies with powers to surveil and disrupt communications in bulk, which according to the UK
Home Office is necessary "in a digital age to disrupt terrorist attacks" (Murdock, 2016).
In this article, we conceptually divide CNOs into three categories of activity: Computer Network
Exploitation  (CNE),  Computer  Network  Attack  (CNA),  and  Computer  Network  Disruption
(CND). 1  CNE refers to the intrusion, through implantation of foreign code into equipment
associated with information infrastructures, as a means to monitor and/or exfiltrate data for
intelligence  or  criminal  investigations.  CND  refers  to  intrusion  and/or  interference  with
equipment  associated  with  network  infrastructures  to  add,  modify,  delete,  or  disrupt  the
integrity of data at rest or in transit. CNA refers to the use of malware to physically degrade or
destroy equipment, physical infrastructure, as well as goods and services that depend on the
integrity of that infrastructure.
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CNOs might  be  lawfully  authorised under  domestic  legislation and be  subject  to  a  legally
prescribed degree  of  oversight  (Hardy& Williams,  2016).  Such activities  may,  however,  be
deliberately obfuscated from authorising judges (2016 FC 1105) or from the oversight bodies
(Security  Intelligence Review Committee,  2014).  They might  also be conducted unlawfully,
insofar  as  either  government  agencies  or  other  parties  may  intrude  upon  intermediaries’
networks or systems and affect the data the organisations are transiting without clear legislative
or  judicial  authorisation.  It  is  also  possible  for  CNO-related measures  to  be  lawful  whilst
simultaneously evading the fulsome transparency and accountability that is required for it to be
recognised as a democratically legitimised activity, violating laws of foreign states, or infringing
upon international human rights.
2. CNO THROUGH "COUNTER-LAW"
Developments  in  CNOs can  be  analysed  through the  frame of  ‘counter-law’.  This  concept
emerged out of criminologist Richard Ericson’s analysis of the relationship between law and
socio-technical practices of surveillance and security (Ericson, 2007, 2008). There are two main
forms of counter-law. The first, counter-law I, refers to the proliferation of criminal procedure
and counter-terrorism statutes that erode or even eliminate constitutional standards of rule of
law. Counter-law I provides state agencies with the legal authority to engage in activities with
expansive operational discretion. Examples of counter-law I include, but aren’t limited to, anti-
terrorism legislation characterised by opaque legal definitions and weak thresholds to justify
‘pre-crime’ state interventions to "punish, disrupt, restrict, or incapacitate, those deemed to
embody future threats to security" (McCulloch and Wilson 2015, p. 2; Zedner, 2009). Counter-
law I developments are also characterised through weakened thresholds for state security and
policing activities, increases in secrecy and use of clandestine powers, and might also occur
under the expansion of  executive mandates such as the use of  ministerial  authorisation to
secretly authorise national security and criminal justice policies.
The second, counter-law II, refers to the proliferation of surveillance technologies and networks
that facilitate new ways to control risks and uncertainties associated with criminality. CNOs for
exploitation, disruption, and attack purposes can be defined as a form of counter-law II because
they refer to a set of practices enabling new ways for government agencies to monitor and act
through connected technologies. Moreover, technological advancements may be compounded
by broadened statutory definitions and lawful powers of counter-law I in ways unforeseen by
legislators, or facilitated with ambiguous legal terminology. This can occur through a disconnect
between ‘outdated’ legislation of the technical environment, as well as through more recently
passed legislation that might contain ambiguous definitions.
The concept of counter-law is focused through Robert Reiner’s (2010) analytical dualism of "the
black letter of the law" (i.e. law doctrine) and the “blue letter of the law” (operational discretion
and activities). Legal permissiveness of “black letter law”, particularly through counter-law I,
creates a “blue letter law” or “law in action”, which refers to actual practices of policing. Bowling
and Sheptycki (2015) discuss how the limits of black letter law in cross-border law enforcement
operations establishes a space wherein blue letter law exists as a kind of ‘post-legal’ space. Just
one example of a ‘post-legal’ space involves a case where the US Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) previously obtained a warrant to ‘hack’ computers around the world, after which it shared
collected  evidence  with  foreign  law  enforcement  agencies.  This  showcases  how  legal
permissiveness -  the capability to engage in such CNE activities -  combined with the legal
permissiveness of data sharing regimes between international police forces can enable activity,
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such as hacking of foreign devices, which might have normally required heightened judicial
approval as part of international warranting practices (Cox, 2016). In this context, law is used
‘against law’, where legal instruments are used to manipulate, undermine, or nullify the ‘spirit’
and effects, if not the letter, of other legal instruments (Bowling& Sheptycki, 2015, p. 169).
Consequently, global policing as a form of “law in action under transnational conditions” does
not exemplify rule of law but instead exemplifies as a form of rule with law.  Bowling and
Sheptycki (2015) conclude that the emergence of a permissive black letter frame unbounds blue
letter law, thereby redrawing the boundaries of discretionary authority and proportionality.
3. CNOS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN AUSTRALIA
Australia’s 2016 Cyber Security Strategy announced AU$230 million to be spent over four years
to  improve  the  security  of  public  and  private  information  communications  infrastructure
(Coyne, 2016). The funds will develop the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), which co-
locates  intelligence  analysts  and  operation  agents  from the  Australian  Signals  Directorate
(ASD), Defence, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), the Australian Federal
Police (AFP), the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, as well as establishing a host of
joint  public-private  partnerships  for  the  sharing  of  threat  intelligence  (Commonwealth  of
Australia,  2016). The ACSC is reminiscent of wider trends in security governance toward a
blurring of boundaries between military, intelligence, security, and law enforcement agencies
and functions (Bowling & Ross, 2006). In both lawful authority and practice, the Australian
Signals Directorate (ASD) possesses offensive CNO capabilities and, in some situations, may
provide assistance to other domestic government agencies (Intelligence Services Act 2001, s.13
and s.13(a)).
A series of unauthorised public disclosures and court documents from the US suggest that
federal and state agencies in Australia use, with others interested in using, such technological
measures. In 2014, the Queensland Police Services’ (QPS) ‘Task Force Argos’ took over a child
pornography website for several months to unmask the IP addresses of visitors to the website
(Cox, 2016). While it is unclear if the server was located in Australia or whether the activity was
judicially approved, the operation did result in at least 30 IP addresses being disclosed to US
authorities (Cox, 2016). WikiLeaks revealed in 2014 that the New South Wales (NSW) Police
acquired several licenses for Gamma Group International’s FinFisher spyware platform. The
Australian Federal Police (AFP) initially refused to provide responsive documents to a FOI
concerning AFP contracts with Gamma Group International but were ultimately revealed as
clients of Hacking Team’s CNO systems since 2011(Sveen& Ockenden, 2015). Northern Territory
Police  (NT),  NSW Police,  ASIO,  and  Victoria’s  Independent  Broad-based  Anti-Corruption
Commission (IBAC) also consulted Hacking Team to learn about their CNO products (Sveen&
Ockenden,  2015).  These  events  showcase  significant  domestic  interest  in  adopting  CNO
technology for law enforcement and national security operations. As discussed in the following
section we will see that some Australian legal frameworks have already existed, where others
have been recently amended to further expand the use of CNO measures that lawfully target
telecommunications and internet intermediary points.
AUTHORISING LAW ENFORCEMENT USE OF CNOS
Several pieces of state and federal legislation authorise Australian government agencies’ use of
CNOs for security and law enforcement purposes. Given space constraints, we briefly discuss
Commonwealth (federal) policy and legislation premised on relevant agencies and functions.
Computer network operations and ‘rule-with-law’ in Australia
Internet Policy Review | http://policyreview.info 5 March 2017 | Volume 6 | Issue 1
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTION (AND ACCESS) ACT 1979, CNOS,
AND COUNTER-LAW
The Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (the TIA) is the primary legal
framework  for  security  intelligence  and  police  access  to  communications  that  transit
telecommunications infrastructure in Australia. It has been incrementally amended since its
inception (Bronitt & Stellios, 2005, 2006). Originally, the TIA existed as an instrument for the
investigation  of  serious  drug  offences  through  "real-time"  interception  of  communications
(voice, data, text, images, and signals) “passing over a telecommunications system” (s.5F) but
has  subsequently  been  amended  to  apply  more  broadly,  including  access  to  stored
communications for any criminal offence without judicial authorisation, and can also be used to
authorise CNE.
Specifically, the TIA legalises exfiltration of intelligence from systems pursuant to Part 2.2 and
2.5 warrants. Part 2.2 warrants are issued to the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
(ASIO)  under  executive  ministerial  authorisation  by  the  federal  Attorney-General  for  both
domestic (s.9, s.9a) and foreign intelligence (s.11a-c). Part 2.5 warrants are issued to federal and
state law enforcement agencies by judges and members of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal
(AAT) pursuant to investigating federal and state level offences (s.39). Each type of warrants
may be issued with respect to either a ‘telecommunications service’ or ‘a person’ (s.39(1); see
also Bronitt & Stellios, 2006, p. 415).
Exfiltration under the TIA is not based on reasonable suspicion that an individual has, or will,
commit a serious offence, but:
upon "reasonable grounds for suspecting that a particular person is using, or is likely to use"1.
(s.46 c) a telecommunications service; or
if information collected under the interception "would be likely to assist in connection with2.
the investigation" (s.46 d) in which the particular person is “involved” (s.46 dIi).
The loose categorical definition of involvement sidesteps a reasonable suspicion threshold to
sweep up a more loosely defined category of ‘person(s) of interest’ (Bronnit & Stellios, 2006, p.
416). Notably, Australian law enforcement and security agencies can use warrants issued for
"telecommunications  service"  (s.46)  to  authorise  CNE  to  target  intermediary  points  in  a
telecommunications  network.  When targeting  end-point  devices  such as  laptops  or  mobile
phones,  authorities  can  use  s.6(q)  of  the  TIA  to  gain  authorisation  for  collecting
communications made by means of a ‘telecommunications device’ used by a person of interest.
The TIA was amended in 2006 to make Part 2.2 and Part 2.5 warrants available for intruding
upon the private lives of persons of interest as well  as persons who are uninvolved in any
specific  criminal  activity  (Stellios  & Bronnitt,  2006,  p.  417).  Authorities  can use  "B-Party"
warrants to exfiltrate communications from someone who uses a telecommunications service to
communicate with a person of interest (Bronitt & Stellios, 2006 p. 417). As long as there is a
connection between the security or law enforcement objective and the use of the B-party’s
telecommunications service, a B-Party warrant may be issued. B-Party warrants may be sought
at  the  mere  likelihood  that  monitoring  the  communication  of  the  B-Party  or  “a
telecommunications service”, if it is also used by a person that is “reasonably suspected of being
engaged in... activities prejudicial to security” (TIA s.9). The black-letter of the TIA places no
explicit limitations on the identity of the party who might use the telecommunication service, on
the content of the intercepted communication, or on the identity of innocent third parties to the
intercepted communication (Bronnitt and Stellios, 2006, p. 417). In principle, the black-letter of
CNEs authorised through B-Party warrants could apply, in the blue-letter operational space, to a
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broad  category  of  persons,  including  judges,  politicians,  lawyers,  journalists,  medical
professionals, and civil rights defenders.
Furthermore, the black-letter of the B-Party warrant authority means that significant segments
of a "telecommunications service" could be intercepted to target even a single subject. Even if,
the B-Party amendment was initially intended to authorise collection on another ‘single’ party
on  a  one-to-one  wireline  conversation,  as  counter-law  II  developments  in  information
infrastructures evolve, the black-letter of the TIA might now authorise the collection of bulk
traffic in and out of a mobile tower.
THE SURVEILLANCE DEVICES ACT 2004, CNOS, AND COUNTER-LAW
The Surveillance Devices Act (Cth) 2004 (SDA) also authorises the use of CNE-related CNO
activities. The Australian Federal Police, the Australian Crime Commission (ACC), the police
force of each State or Territory, the New South Wales Crime Commission, amongst others, (SDA
s6(1)) are authorised to conduct CNE when investigating serious offences.
A range of warranting powers were included in the SDA. One of them, for a "data surveillance
device" (s.6(1)), can be used to compromise mobile phones, laptops, or other digital devices
operated by Australian citizens. A data surveillance device is defined in the Act as “a device or
program used to record or monitor the input into or out of a computer” (S.6(1)). By extension, a
“computer”,  is  defined  under  the  Act  as  “any  electronic  device  for  storing  or  processing
information” (s. 6 SD Act).
In practice, the aforementioned black-letter definitions could include the use of any  type of
technical device or programme in blue-letter CNE activities to gain access to data inside, or
flowing into or out of, any electronic, smart or connective technology, such as computers, iPads,
tablets, smartphones, GPS systems, and vehicular control systems. The black-letter ambiguity in
the SDA regarding data surveillance device warrants might also authorise targeting upstream of
the end-point device, such as a router or other networks many devices use, to the effect of a
single warrant affecting thousands of  devices and users.  While clearly being one device or
possibly one system, a router for instance relays information regarding multiple devices relying
on that router.
In  addition  to  the  ambiguity  of  "device"  in  black-letter  terms,  the  SDA consistently  uses
terminology  suggesting  warrants  will  be  used  to  target  specific  computing  devices  –  a
“computer”, a “device”, an “instrument”, an “apparatus” – and thus implies a degree of targeted
specificity in the warrant scheme. S.18 of the SDA expands this definition to include multiple
devices.  Per  Section  18(3)(b)  and(f),  surveillance  devices  and  “enhancement  equipment  in
relation to the surveillance device” can be connected to any “system” to perform the operation.
Furthermore, s.19(5) authorises interference with third parties’ property that is not the subject
of the investigation. In effect, this means that, similar to counter-law I developments concerning
B-Party warrants in the TIA, third parties can be affected by CNEs by authorities for domestic
investigative purposes.
THE ASIO ACT, CNOS, AND COUNTER-LAW
CNO  measures  are  authorised  by  Section  25(a)  of  the  Australian  Security  Intelligence
Organisation  Act  1979  (ASIO Act).  The  statute  empowers  the  Attorney-General  to  issue  a
"computer  access  warrant"  following  a  request  from  the  Director-General  of  ASIO.  Such
warrants authorises ASIO to intrude on “a target computer”, a “telecommunications facility
operated by a Commonwealth or a carrier”, or “any other electronic storage equipment” or a
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“data  storage  device”  (ASIO Act,  s.25(a)).  These  warrants  are  granted when the  Attorney-
General is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that access to data held in a
computer would “substantially assist the collection of intelligence” in relation to a “security
matter” (ASIO Act, s.25(a)).
ASIO’s CNO-related powers were expanded in late 2014 under the ASIO Act. The definition of a
"computer"  was  broadened  to  include  “one  or  more  computers”,  “one  or  more  computer
systems”, “one or more computer networks”, or “any combination of the above” (ASIO Act, s.4).
The warrants also let ASIO use “any other computer or communication in transit to add, copy,
delete or alter data...for the purpose of obtaining access to data relevant to the security matter
and held on the target computer” (National Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No.1) 2014),
Explanatory Memorandum). As a result,  a single computer access warrant can allow CNE-
facilitated  surveillance  of  entire  businesses,  university  networks,  telecommunications
companies,  or  core internet infrastructure for gathering intelligence or disrupting activities
(Hardy, 2015). The only explicit limitation on ASIO’s use of CNO measures is if the operation
would “cause any other material loss or damage to other persons lawfully using a computer”
(s.25A(5)(b)). What constitutes “material loss” is not defined or set out in the Act or Explanatory
Memorandum that accompanied the amendment.
THE AUSTRALIAN SIGNALS DIRECTORATE AND DOMESTIC ASSISTANCE IN
CNOS
The ASD has a mandate to assist domestic agencies to carry out their functions under the
Intelligence Services Act 2001 (ISA) (s.13 and s.13(a)). 2 In particular, they can provide practical
assistance when domestic agencies are addressing activities that are, or “are likely to be”, a
threat to security (ISA 2001, s.9;s.13,s.13a) with ministerial authorisation. This assistance draws
on the ASD’s “cryptography”, “communication” and “computer technologies” capabilities (s.7).
Under existing law and practice it is unclear how often ASD provides technical assistance. In a
similar  jurisdiction,  such as  Canada,  approximately  300 requests  were  made for  domestic
assistance in a four-year period between 2009 and 2012 (Freeze, 2014).
CNOs are also subject to a limited degree of oversight and accountability mechanisms even
though they can be deeply intrusive investigative and intelligence tools. Such mechanisms tend
to be structurally deficient, however, because many of the agencies responsible for oversight and
review are restricted to performing a legal compliance function. And as we note in the following
section,  in  an  era  where  CNOs  are  characterised  by  counter-law  developments  it  can  be
challenging for intelligence and policing agencies to exceed such extraordinarily broad black-
letter statutes when it comes to actual blue-letter practice.
DEMOCRATIC SAFEGUARDS, SECRECY, AND COUNTER-LAW
Many CNO measures in Australia are performed with executive oversight. Such oversight is
meant to ensure compliance with the law as well as to propose non-binding recommendations to
influence  government  policy  and  strategy  on  counter-terrorism  matters.  3  Furthermore,
legislation that enhances the Australian secrecy regime and establishes anti-whistleblower laws
have exacerbated constraints on public disclosure and debate surrounding government usage of
CNOs. While a full review of the Australian oversight, accountability, secrecy and whistleblower
regimes are beyond the scope of this article (however, see Hardy & Williams, 2016, 2014) there
are several weaknesses in these regimes linked with CNOs and counter-law.
First, while the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) can review
the ASIO’s administration and expenditure, it lacks a mandate to review intelligence-gathering
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matters  or  operations  (Lynch  et  al.,  2014,  p.  156).  ASIO  can  also  redact  information  in
committee reports provided to the PJCIS (Lynch et al., 2014, p.156). Secondly the Office of the
Inspector-General  of  Intelligence  and  Security  (IGIS)  serves  as  an  independent  executive
oversight  body  for  the  intelligence  community.  The  IGIS’  is  mandated  to  ensure  legal
compliance of security intelligence activities, such as guaranteeing that all ministerial guidelines
and directives are appropriately followed (Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act
1986 (Cth). It relies on classified submissions from security intelligence and law enforcement
agencies to assess adherence with laws, directions, and guidelines, and ‘group-specific’ human
rights codes (e.g., Age Discrimination Act 2004, Disability Discrimination Act 1992, Racial
Discrimination  Act  1975,  or  the  Sex  Discrimination  Act  1984).  However,  whereas
proportionality tests might normally include balancing against a formal Bill of Rights, Australia
lacks this aspect of basic law (barring that which exists in the State of Victoria and ACT). As a
result, balancing is generally less robust in Australia than in other jurisdictions such as Canada
and Europe. Moreover, even the Victoria bill of rights contains black-letter exceptions. S.21(3)
seemingly grants an exception regarding impacts upon innocent third parties during the lawful
use of CNOs, so long as the operation is "in accordance with procedures, established by law"
(s.21(3)). Broadly, the lack of a federal bill of rights in tandem with exemptions mean that a
commonplace method of evaluating the proportionality of CNO measures is lacking.
And lastly,  the Privacy Act 1988  places few limits on the sharing, retention, integrity,  and
accuracy  of  personal  information  acquired  through  CNOs  amongst  Australian  security
intelligence and law enforcement organisations (Molnar& Parsons, 2016; Privacy Act 1988).
ASIO and the ASD are exempt from the Act in its entirely (Privacy Act 1988, s.7). And while law
enforcement agencies are broadly covered by the Act they enjoy considerable exemption under
the Act. Generally speaking, disclosing personal information is permitted for law enforcement if
it is "reasonably necessary for the enforcement of the criminal law, or of a law imposing a
pecuniary penalty, or for the protection of the public revenue (ALRC, 2008, s.37).
These privacy concerns are exacerbated by the security risks linked to CNO measures. Where
malware code is  used to target an individual,  and designed to affect  the type of  device or
application they are using, then the code is simultaneously capable of running against the same
devices and applications of non-targeted persons. By concealing the weaknesses of the device or
exploit code used to perform the CNO, not only is the security of a specific target compromised,
but so is the security of all other persons who happen to use the same device or rely on the same
codes. Exploits are reproducible, and so the failure to disclose vulnerabilities can mean that
other  parties  (e.g.,  nation-state  actors,  cyber  mercenary  firms,  independent  hackers,  or
academics) can also identify and exploit the same vulnerabilities. Furthermore, in failing to
notify  companies  of  weaknesses  in  their  defenses  or  flaws  in  their  software  code  those
companies can suddenly fall victim to the state’s exploit code when it is accidentally released to
the public. In the US for example, the intelligence development of vulnerabilities is subject to
independent  review  by  committee  through  the  so-called  vulnerabilities  equities  program
(Daniel, 2014). The black-letter of Australian legislation and policy, as well as the oversight
system,  fails  to  account  for  how  the  blue-letter  operations  introduce  systemic  threats  to
individual and collective privacy and security.
The relative weakness of the structure of oversight, accountability, official oversight and review
functions is worsened by counter-law I legislation that cloaks most CNO measures in secrecy.
When CNOs are pursued through ASIO Act computer access warrants, they can be designated as
a "special intelligence operation" (SIO) by the Attorney-General (ASIO Act, s.35(b), a measure
that  provides  civil  and  criminal  immunity  for  ASIO officers  and  affiliates  involved  in  the
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operation (Hardy & Williams, 2016, ASIO Act, s.35(k)) and that also imposes a five year penalty
for “disclosing information” related to the operation. This term can be extended to ten years if
the disclosure “will  endanger  the health or  safety  of  any person or  prejudice  the effective
conduct  of  a  special  intelligence operation” (ASIO Act  35(p)).  There are no exceptions for
journalists or whistleblowers, and the statute has been understood by the Attorney-General to
apply “generally to all citizens” (Williams, 2014). While SIOs represent the most harsh secrecy
provisions in Australia, two others are worth mentioning. Section 70 of the Crimes Act would
make any disclosure of a CNO (including those not designated as a SIO) by any current or
former Commonwealth officer punishable by imprisonment of up to two years for sharing if the
disclosure “would be prejudicial to the effective working of government” (Hardy and Williams
2014, p. 802; Crimes Act 1914, s.70). Another secrecy offence in the Crimes Act, Section 79, is
also generally applicable to both citizens and non-citizens and carries an increased maximum
penalty of seven years’ imprisonment. Unlike s.70 and 35P, the disclosure, however, must be
accompanied with an intention to cause harm (Hardy & Williams, 2014, p. 803-807; Crimes Act
1914,  s.79).  Aggressive  secrecy  provisions  surrounding information that  may pertain  to  an
ongoing SIO could also undermine any responsible vulnerability reporting process that help to
maintain the security and integrity of  internet communication infrastructures as a broader
public good.
4. DISCUSSION
Counter-law is exemplified by CNOs through the collision of technological advancements and
legal  powers.  This  occurs  in  two  main  ways.  First,  outdated  definitions  of  technology  in
legislation  are  surpassed  by  an  interconnected  technological  environment  that  works  to
decouple the use of CNOs from clearly defined boundaries. The disconnect between ambiguous
black-letter definitions in primary legislation from technological environments results in the
relatively unrestrained application of CNOs. While the use of CNOs can remain ‘lawful’ in a
narrow sense, their application in blue-letter space, including the range of privacy, civil liberties,
and security risks they introduce, are disproportionately broad.
Second, even more recent counter-law I developments have involved a purposeful counter-law
trend black-letter ‘catch-all’ terminology. For instance, the 2014 amendment of the black-letter
definition  of  "a  computer"  under  the  ASIO  Act  as  “a  network”  or  “any  combination”  of
computers  and  networks  presents  an  unrestrained  limit  to  perform CNOs  in  the  current
technological environment. Furthermore, more recent counter-law I developments allow CNOs
in  domestic  contexts  to  reach  remotely  beyond  mere  interception  of  information  that  is
transiting networks and to actually annul and/or modify information and processes existing on
systems,  sometimes  even  potentially  to  include  physical  effects  on  the  infrastructure.  The
introduction of disruption measures places strain on rule of law principles of procedural fairness
and due process rights.
Moreover,  the  mechanisms  that  democratically  elected  representatives  created  -  namely
oversight and review bodies - in combination with judicial authorities are not necessarily able to
assure the public that basic democratic freedoms are not inappropriately trodden upon. Laws, as
they are currently written, provide authority to identify and evaluate instances where security
and policing agencies act illegally; this means, however, that oversight and review bodies are
similarly ensnared in counter-law developments because they may be deeply challenged to find
illegal what is overtly made legal by these agencies’ lawful authority (as example, see Robinson,
2015). While the general trend of counter-law developments and CNOs are likely to be felt
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across many liberal democratic jurisdictions, Australia is in a novel position in comparison to its
Five Eyes partners. Unlike Canada, the United States, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom,
Australia does not have a formal bill of rights or a regional judicial body to adjudicate on human
rights. Given that government agencies possess lawful authority to conduct unbounded CNO
operations  and  can  seek  relatively  unbounded  warrants  instead  of  those  with  strongly
circumscribed limits, the rule of law has become distorted and replaced with rule with law
(Bowling & Sheptyicki, 2015). The combined force of the technical environment outpacing laws
on the books, along with new laws which are passed to provide wide legal remit for blue-letter
CNO operations, have considerably threatened the rule of law itself. As a result, the ‘lawful’ use
of  CNOs in Australia  can disturb the preservation of  democratic  freedoms and procedural
justice.
5. CONCLUSION
While this article focused on the reach and implications of CNOs in Australia, our discussion
carries broader implications concerning debates surrounding meaningful regulation CNOs in
national security and policing operations. Future work might consider the extent to which a
space  of  ‘post-legal’  exceptionality  is  emerging  for  the  use  of  CNOs  via  counter-law
developments. In pursuing this line of analysis it would be useful to juxtapose the Australian
case with others, where similar counter-law manifestations are taking place but which possess a
formal bill  of  rights.  Specifically,  is  it  the case that  such a bill  would effectively moderate
counter-law infringements on civil liberties as they pertain to CNOs? Though the state ‘drives’
CNO operations they are resisted by private companies and NGOs that attempt to make such
operations more transparent, more clearly accountable to lawmakers or the public, and more
demonstrably targeted. Additional lines of research might also investigate the effectiveness, and
tactics  used,  to  reinforce  the  rule  of  law.  Are  such efforts  broadly  successful,  or  are  they
dependent on specific popular media or other kinds of social capital?
A number of ethical questions concerning procedural fairness and due process also emerge. For
instance,  while  forensics  standards  exist  for  analysing  computers  there  are  no  equivalent
standards for using malware that transmits evidence across the internet. The result is that there
is a very low standard required to use the tools without an equivalent balancing to ensure that
their  operation does  not  render  collected  information inadmissible  in  court  as  a  result  of
mistakes in how exploit code is crafted, deployed, or potentially tampered with by a third-party
while in transit. Furthermore, the use of CNOs might be in excess of the threat posed, or also
run contrary to the intended effect. Mistakes in how exploit code is crafted or deployed can have
unexpected consequences when deployed in production environments and disruptions could
inhibit the communications of targets and non-targets alike.
CNOs represent a significant transformation of state authority to intrude and affect digital
information. Such measures often occur under a veil of exceptional secrecy and jeopardise the
universal security of information communication systems. Thus, in addition to such activities
raising  questions  about  the  appropriate  degree  of  power  invested  in  state  authorities,  the
proliferation of CNOs by governments around the world for domestic investigations that have
global  reach  (Cox,  2016),  for  intelligence  operations  targeting  individuals  and  millions  of
persons alike (Gallagher, 2014; Schneier, 2013), and for damaging critical infrastructure and
computer records (Zetter, 2014; Zetter, 2016; Greenwald & Fishman, 2015), it should also raise
vital  questions  about  the  appropriateness,  democratic  interest,  and  accountability  of  state
operations that expose populations to the pervasive insecurity through exploitable weaknesses
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that can further potential abuse against innocent third parties.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Intelligence agencies such as the Communications Security Establishment, Canada’s foreign
signal intelligence agency, categorise these three types of activities under a common heading.
We have opted to do the same, though with a broader conceptualisation of ‘operations’, as those
agencies. See: "CSEC Cyber Threat Capabilities - SIGINT and ITS: an end-to-end approach",
https://www.christopher-parsons.com/Main/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/doc-..., page 22.
2. The ISA does not provide explicit constraints upon the ASD’s efforts to perform CNOs (ISA,
s.12) to "obtain intelligence for the purposes of national security, foreign relations, or national
economic well-being" (ISA, s.11). That is to say, CNO measures (including CNE, CND, and
CNAs) for all practical purposes, are unregulated when directed at persons or activities outside
of Australia (ISA, 2001, s.7).
3. For a thorough review of the Australian oversight and accountability regime, see Hardy and
Williams (2016).
